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Defendants and Appellants, John C. Josephson and Geraldine C. 
Josephson, (hereinafter "defendants"), by and through their 
attorney of record, Gordon A. Madsen, hereby petition for rehearing 
pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH 
Gordon A. Madsen, attorney of record for plaintiff, hereby 
certifies that this petition is present in good faith and not for 
delay. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals was filed December 22, 
1994. This petition for rehearing has therefore been timely served 
and filed. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS OF LAW OR FACT WHICH PLAINTIFF CLAIMS 
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED 
POINT 1. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
CONTRADICTS ITSELF ON THE ISSUE OF UNPAID TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS AND 
LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT SAID ISSUE COULD AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
TRIED IN THE ORIGINAL ACTION BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND IS THEREFORE 
PRECLUDED IN THE SECOND ACTION. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals at page 5 states in 
substance that the issues of unpaid taxes and assessments did not 
have to be raised by plaintiff in the prior action between the 
parties because said claims "were not ripe." 
Notwithstanding that conclusion, at page 7 of the said 
decision the Court of Appeals states that "The fact that some taxes 
and assessments were due and owing at the time of the Judgment is 
a strong indication that the District Court's ruling did not 
terminate the Contract, but rather was limited to the issues 
discussed." (Emphasis added.) 
We believe these statements are inconsistent. If the 
taxes were due and owing then the claim that defendants owed them 
was indeed ripe, and could and should have been raised in the first 
action. Accordingly the trial courts determination in the first 
action that the contract "was paid in full" must be construed to 
mean that it was paid in full as to all matters that could or 
should have been brought before it at that time, and that of 
necessity includes the claims asserted by plaintiffs in the second 
case. 
POINT 2. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS MISAPPREHENDED THAT 
MATTERS RAISED IN POST-JUDGMENT MOTION ARE NOT BARRED FROM 
APPELLATE REVIEW WHERE THEY DO NOT RELATE TO EVIDENTIARY MATTERS. 
The Court of Appeals rules in this action that raising an 
2 
issue in a motion to alter and amend does not preserve it for 
appellate review, unless in effect the lower court makes it the 
subject of an evidentiary hearing. If there is such a rule, it 
certainly cannot be applicable in a summary judgment case. By 
definition we are never going to be dealing with an evidentiary 
hearing on a motion for summary judgment. The only justification 
for a rule that a matter first raised in a motion for a new trial 
or to alter and amend should not be reviewable on appeal is that it 
should have been raised during the evidentiary hearing when the 
court could have corrected the error. This will only occur in 
proceedings which are not limited to legal issues. 
That reason for the rule does not exist in summary 
judgment proceedings and therefore the rule does not exist. We are 
dealing in this action with a summary judgment, which means the 
court is dealing with questions of law and not with evidence. At 
page 6 of the opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals cites the 
case of Bar son v. E.R. Squibb & Sons. Inc., 682 P2d 832, (Utah 
1984). That case involved a belated objection relating to evidence 
in a jury trial. It had nothing to do with an issue of law. All 
of the other cases cited on page 6 of the opinion under the hearing 
"Termination of Contract" likewise deal with issues that should 
have been raised during trials. They have nothing to do with legal 
issues being considered in a motion for summary judgment. The 
Court of Appeals states in note 5 of the opinion in this case: 
"The trial court did not take evidence or hold an evidentiary 
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hearing on the issue, but instead simply denied the Motion to Alter 
or Amend." This statement entirely begs the question and is 
without meaning. This is a motion for summary judgment so of 
course there was no evidentiary hearing. 
It appears to be well established that appellate courts 
can properly consider legal arguments which are first raised on 
appeal. If this is so how much more can they consider legal 
matters raised in post judgment motions. We cite to the court from 
5 Am. Jur. Appeal and Error, Sec. 546:2 
"...However, an exception to the general rule has been 
made in some cases where the newly advanced theory 
involves only a question of law arising upon the proved 
or admitted facts, and is finally determinative of the 
case. Judgments have been sustained in such cases upon 
a theory not asserted or urged below upon the ground that 
the same result would necessarily be reached upon a new 
trial, if granted. The rule requiring adherence to the 
theory relied on below does not mean that the parties are 
limited in the appellate court to the same reasons or 
arguments advance in the lower court upon the matter or 
question in issue..." (Emphasis added.) 
Defendants clearly asserted that the uniform real estate 
contract could not sustain plaintiffs7 claims, and were at liberty 
to assert any and all reasons available in support of their 
position. 
The opinion of the court of appeals states by way of 
dicta that even if the issue had been properly preserved, 
defendants would fail anyway because in effect "paid in full" does 
not mean paid in full, but for the reasons stated in Point 2 above 
defendants respectfully submit that those words must be construed 
& 
to mean what they say. 
POINT 3. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS MISAPPREHENDED THE 
STATUS OF PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT FOR ATTORNEY FEES, AND THE ISSUE OF 
THE REASONABLENESS OF ATTORNEY FEES REQUIRES AN EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING. 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is to the effect that 
defendants did not contest the affidavit of plaintiff's attorney 
regarding attorney fees. 
The Court of Appeals fails to note that the affidavit of 
Mr. Broadbent regarding attorney fees was not filed as part of the 
motion for summary judgment and therefore no counter affidavit was 
possible or required. It its ruling on January 4, 1993, the court 
directed as part of its memorandum decision that: 
"Plaintiffs attorney to prepare affidavit for attorney fees 
"Objection to be filed in 10 days" 
The affidavit was served on January 22, 1993, and filed 
on January 25, 1993. (See Docket in Addendum to Reply Brief of 
Appellant and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment at R. 105.) 
Defendants objected thereto by serving Motion to Alter and Amend 
and Memorandum on February 4, 1993, and the same were filed on Feb. 
5, 1993. Although the Docket shows these documents to have been 
filed, the clerk's office somehow lost them, and these documents 
were added to the record by stipulation of the parties. 
Notwithstanding the timely filing of said documents as an objection 
to the entire proposed summary judgment including the attorney fee 
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portion thereof, Judge Reese entered Summary Judgment on Feb. 10, 
without an evidentiary hearing as required by Provo City Corp. V. 
Cropper 28 Utah 2d 1, 497 P.2d 629 (1972). It should be noted that 
the said case of Provo City Corp. v. Cropper holds that an 
evidentiary hearing is necessary "unless the parties agree 
otherwise." There was no agreement by the parties that attorney 
fees be handled by affidavit. Without an evidentiary hearing there 
is no way that defendants can determine how many hours were spent 
on this case by plaintiff's counsel. There is no way that 
defendants can file an affidavit to contract plaintiff^s asserted 
facts. That can only be done with an evidentiary hearing where 
cross examination is possible. 
POINT 4. THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY FAILED TO 
ADDRESS THE ISSUES OF COLLATERAL ATTACK AND EXISTENCE OF ISSUE OF 
FACT. 
The court of appeals should have dealt with these issues, 
but erroneously declined to do so. The issues as developed in the 
two briefs filed by defendants herein were proper and substantial 
issues and should have addressed by the court and should have been 
ruled upon in favor of defendants for the reasons set forth in said 
briefs by defendants. 
Defendants will not repeat those arguments herein except 
as to the issue of the supposed representation that the issue of 
taxes and assessments was to be excluded from the trial. 
On motion for summary judgment, all inferences are to be 
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construed in favor of the party moved against. The Court of 
Appeals refers to the affidavit of Mary Whetman and to the 
affidavit of plaintiff's counsel, David Broadbent. Mrs. Whetman 
asserts in her affidavit: "8. During the trial before Judge 
Moffat regarding the right-of-way claimed by the Josephsons across 
our property, Mr. Cummings,their attorney, represented to us and to 
the court that the Josephsons would pay any taxes and water 
assessments which were due on their parcel, as they had previously 
paid since 1973 throughout the course of our contract with them." 
(Emphasis added. See R. 75, and Ex. B in Addendum of Brief of 
Appellees.) 
David K. Broadbent in his affidavit stated that on 
"several occasions prior to trial...and on at least one occasion 
during the trial, Mr. Cummmings, their attorney, represented to me 
and to the court that the Josephsons would pay any taxes and water 
assessments which were due on their parcel. He stated to the court 
(and the Covingtons and their counsel agreed) that the case before 
the court was to determine the existence of the right-of-way which 
was the subject of the action." (Emphasis added. See R. 63 and 
Ex. G in Addendum of Brief of Appellees.) 
Both plaintiff, Whetman, and her attorney Mr. Broadbent 
themselves admit that such taxes were due at the time of the trial. 
(See Point 1 above.) Mrs. Whetman makes no claim that Cummings 
made any representation before the trial, and Mr. Broadbent who 
claims that he did, does not assert that the claimed 
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representations before trial were agreed to by plaintiff or 
himself. He only claims that the representation at the trial was 
agreed to by plaintiff and himself. Where he does not make the 
same claim as to the other so-called representations the inference 
is that any such representations were not agreed to nor relied upon 
by plaintiffs or himself. Nowhere in his affidavit does he claim 
reliance on any such representation. Defendant Josephson in making 
his affidavit thought he was fairly meeting the assertions of Mr. 
Broadbent and Mrs. Whetman. Under these facts to rule that denial 
of a stipulation is not a denial of a representation is not fair 
and flies in the face of the rule that summary judgment is proper 
only if the party moved against cannot recover upon any theory 
reasonably claimed by such party. Even plaintiffs did not claim 
such a narrow and unreasonable interpretation. Josephson has 
clearly stated in good faith facts which raise a bona fide issue of 
fact. Surely, a sense of fairness dictates that Mr. Josephsons 
affidavit must be construed to have created a factual issue on this 
matter. 
POINT 5. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING DEFENDANT ORAL 
ARGUMENT. 
Defendant's counsel did not receive notice of the hearing 
of this matter, as set forth in the affidavit of defendants' 
counsel filed herein when counsel learned of this error. Failure 
to give such oral argument to defendant when such was allowed to 
plaintiff constitutes a denial of due process. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons therefore that the court has created an 
unworkable rule and because a great injustice has been done to the 
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